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The Return of the Two Nationalisms 
June 22, 2008 in Tales from Taiwan by The China Beat | 6 comments 
One fascinating aspect of the KMT’s regaining political dominance in Taiwan is the reappearance of two 
forms of nationalism that have been central to that party’s political ideology, namely Greater China (大
中華) and anti-Japanese resistance (抗日). Both have enjoyed a certain degree of legitimacy in the 
context of modern Chinese history, yet each carries its own risks as well. 
The theme of Greater China found clear expression in President Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九’s inaugural 
address, which emphasized the idea that the residents of both China and Taiwan were part of a 
greater ”Chinese nation” (中華民族). It also seemed significant that Ma made no mention of Japan, as 
well as the issue of whether Taiwan (or the Republic of China, for that matter) is a sovereign state. 
From a diplomatic perspective, the skirting of such issues in order to enhance cross-Strait negotiations 
makes considerable sense, as can be seen in the successful conclusion of agreements on direct flights 
and tourism. However, as I noted in a previous blog, the question of who will benefit from these 
policies is unclear, and there are also concerns about the costs. One example is Ma’s agreeing to be 
addressed as ”Mr. Ma” when he meets China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait 
(ARATS) Chairman Chen Yunlin 陳雲林 later this year. While such compromises have a reasonable 
chance of furthering future ties between China and Taiwan, one cannot help but think of other leaders 
from the previous century who were willing to make all manner of sacrifices in the interest of ”peace 
in our time”. 
Anti-Japanese sentiments made a dramatic comeback in Taiwan’s political arena during a diplomatic 
row with Japan that ensued after the June 10 sinking of a Taiwanese fishing vessel by a Japanese 
patrol boat in disputed waters surrounding islets known in Taiwan as Tiaoyutai 釣魚台 and in Japan as 
the Senkakus. Both Taipei and Tokyo claim these islets and their surrounding waters, in part due to 
their abundant fishery resources and potential natural gas deposits. Japan subsequently apologized 
and offered to negotiate compensation for the fishing boat’s captain, but the immediate aftermath of 
the incident was marked by highly provocative comments, including Premier Liu Chao-shiuan 劉兆玄 
allowing himself to be goaded by hard-line KMT legislators into saying that he did not ”exclude war” 
with Japan. 
Perhaps more importantly, in addition to recalling Koh Se-kai 許世楷, Taiwan’s de facto ambassador to 
Japan, the Ma government scrapped the Committee on Japanese Affairs, a body that had played a key 
role in improving Taiwan’s ties with Japan. Established in 2005, this committee comprised experts who 
reported directly to the foreign minister and provided recommendations on Taiwan-Japan relations. 
The presence of this committee contributed to steadily improving yet unofficial links with Tokyo, with 
Japan overtaking the United States as Taiwan’s second-biggest trading partner after China in 2006, 
and the two nations becoming each other’s top foreign tourist destinations. 
Now that this committee has been axed, one wonders who will be responsible for managing ties with 
Japan, and whether the links between these two countries will improve or continue to deteriorate. If 
the Ma administration continues to play on emotional anti-Japanese sentiments, the people of Japan 
might well conclude that years of friendship with Taiwan are now at risk. Such sentiments are already 
being expressed in editorials in the Japanese media, which point to the rise of Greater China and anti-
Japanese sentiments as harbingers of what could be a ”nightmarish” future. 
There have also been signs that these tensions are infecting Taiwan’s own domestic arena. On June 
18, following a meeting with former president Chen Shui-bian 陳水扁, Koh Se-kai was struck by a 
protester who claimed to be a member of the pro-unification Patriot Association (愛國同心會). This 
assault followed highly charged comments by KMT lawmakers, who labeled Koh as a “Taiwan traitor” (
台奸) and “a Japanese, not a Taiwanese”. There have also been reports of Japanese students being 
beaten up, and there is now enhanced security at the Taipei Japanese School. 
It seems particularly fascinating that both of these forms of nationalism have also helped shape CCP 
ideology, which suggests that they might serve as a common ground for future negotiations. 
Moreover, both the CCP and the KMT have found it useful to exploit such sentiments in order to 
distract attention from other issues. In Taiwan today, the stock market has plummeted 15% since 
Ma’s inauguration, while prices are continuing to rise. In addition, the new government has been 
plagued by controversies over its members having until recently enjoyed dual citizenship or 
permanent residency, including the current Foreign Minister, who somehow managed to apply for a 
green card while serving as ambassador to Guatemala. As a result, the administration’s popularity has 
been steadily declining, and even a recent United Daily News (聯合報) poll showed Ma’s own rating at 
50%, down from 66% one month ago. 
Finally, there are disturbing indications of politics once again extending its claws into academia. One 
example is the decision by National Cheng Chih University (國立政治大學) not to extend the contract (不
續聘) of former Ministry of Education Secretary Chuang Kuo-jung 莊國榮 on charges of “conduct 
unbecoming of a professor” (行為不檢). While Chuang had made some highly offensive remarks about 
Ma’s father, he had subsequently apologized, and the department and college faculty review 
committees had only recommended a suspension, only to be overruled by the university review 
committee in favor of the harsher punishment. During the past 10 years, there have been 106 
instances of contract termination at Taiwan’s universities, but those that involved charges of “conduct 
unbecoming of a professor” tended to be cases of sexual harassment, rape, and corruption, and 
usually followed the accused faculty member’s being convicted in a court of law. There have also been 
difficulties surrounding the proposed reappointment (回任) of former Representative to the United 
States Joseph Wu 吳釗燮 at the same university. These events, combined with reports that many 
officials appointed by the Chen administration are now in danger of losing their jobs, suggest a return 
of the ”cicada in winter effect” (寒蟬效應), by which opposition voices gradually fall silent. 
One hopes that the above instances are merely aberrations, and that the KMT’s return to power, 
combined with the understandable quest for improved relations with China, do not come at the price 
of rampant nationalism and the abandonment of the democratic freedoms that so many men and 
women fought so hard to achieve. 
Note: Some of the contents of this blogpost were inspired by Max Hirsch’s June 17 article entitled “Goodwill 
between Japan, Taiwan fading after key committee scrapped”. 
 
